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ABSTRACT 
  
According to theory a pure meritocracy is efficient because individual members are 
competitively rewarded according to their individual contributions to society. However, 
purely individually based meritocracies seldom occur. We introduce a new model of social 
production called “team-based meritocracy” (TBM) in which individual members are 
rewarded based on their team membership. We demonstrate that as long as such team 
membership is both mobile and competitively based on contributions, individuals are able 
to coordinate a complex and counterintuitive asymmetric equilibrium that is close to 
Pareto-optimal. Our findings are relevant to many contemporary societies in which rewards 
are at least in part determined via membership in organizations such as for example firms, 
and organizational membership is increasingly determined by contribution rather than 
privilege.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, social and organizational stratification has often been based on 
arbitrary criteria such as gender, race, class, nepotism or cronyism, all of which are quite 
inefficient since they are unrelated to a person’s social contribution, and therefore do not 
provide optimal incentives to contribute. Examples include caste systems, aristocratic 
societies1, societies that still bar women or minorities from full participation, or family 
businesses that assign positions based on birth or family ties. Contemporary societies 
however are increasingly becoming meritocracies, helped along by equal-rights 
movements, and increasing global competition that encourages elimination of slack2 (see, 
e.g., Huyett & Viguerie, 2005). In a pure meritocracy members are rewarded on an 
individual basis and in proportion to their contribution. Because of the ensuing competition 
they contribute until the marginal benefit of contributing equals its marginal cost.3 A pure 
meritocracy is therefore a model of production for purely private goods by relatively 
isolated agents.  
However, societies are made up of organizations. An individual’s payoffs in a 
modern economy are rarely based on individual contribution alone but are to a significant 
extent disbursed via organizations to which individuals belong, e.g. firms. Their rewards to 
members are often team-based because 1) some sought-after organizationally based 
rewards are simply not divisible such as the work atmosphere, facilities (Burdett & Coles, 
1999), or the organization’s ability to provide superior co-workers (Booth & Zoega, 2005) 
or 2) some important divisible benefits such as corporate health care packages could, at 
least to some degree, be linked to individual output but doing so would be too complex and 
                                                 
1 See e.g., pre-revolutionary France. 
2 See e.g. Singapore, a very successful Asian country by most standards. It seceded from Malaysia in 1965 
because it rejected ethnic quotas in the assignment of social and professional roles in favor of a meritocracy. 
Ethnic quotas persist in Malaysia to this day. 
3 Other benefits of such a system include its perceived fairness which engenders broad support and hence, 
stability, and placing the best suited person into a given position.  
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costly,4 or 3) shared monetary rewards such as equal-share partnerships, gainsharing 
schemes or a relatively uniform salary level within a firm are often HR policy because they 
improve morale (another team good) (Campbell & Kamlani, 1997; Lazear, 1989; Pencavel, 
1977) and productivity5 (Kruse,1993; Milgrom & Roberts, 1990). In a market for 
organizational membership typical of a modern organization-based meritocracy where 
members are increasingly mobile both socially and geographically, those who contribute 
more are more likely to be part of organizations where membership offers better rewards, 
and these rewards are often collective. For example, within and across industries employers 
vary in their desirability based on the level of tangible and intangible benefits they offer. 
Similarly, more successful academics cluster in more respected academic units (and share 
among other things the intellectual stimulation of their workplace, salary level and 
reputation); among students, better students self-select into teams that get higher grades, or 
get accepted to schools and universities.6  
All these examples have the following features in common: 1) The size of the 
organizational strata is fixed, at least in the short term, that is, the number of positions in a 
given organization or set of organizations is limited, and access to the desirable strata is 
therefore competitive, 7 2) individual inputs are measurable, 3) once individuals are 
organizationally stratified based on their contributions, they face a social dilemma with 
some incentive to shirk with regards to their organization’s team product. (For a firm the 
most obvious team product is revenue, for academics or students it would be, among other 
                                                 
4 Other examples in this category include employee development programs, or vacation policies.  
5 Another example are uniform bonuses, uniform company-wide perks, and other payoffs that are kept equal 
for the sake of employee satisfaction or group cohesion. For example, the salaries and bonuses of associates 
in elite New York law firms for example are “in lockstep” both within and across firms (Sorkin, 2007).  
6 In Bulgaria for example, entry examination grades plus some grades from previous years in middle school 
are summed up. Students are ranked according to that sum and a fixed number of them enter the country’s top 
high schools, those ranking below go to the second tier, etc.. 
7 Organizational stratification always involves fixed group (stratum) size at least in the short run. Examples 
include journal space in tier 1 journals, or labor markets in which there are usually a fixed number of jobs 
available, such as the annual supply of junior positions at top universities. In general, there are usually more 
“perfect” candidates than positions and a perfect candidate reaches the top stratum with a probability of less 
than 1. 
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things, their institution’s reputation.) However, 4) the social dilemma is mitigated by the 
threat of downward mobility: given mobility with regard to organizational membership, a 
non-contributor is eventually replaced by a contributor.8  
A system characterized by features (1)-(4) above, which we will henceforth call a 
“team-based meritocracy” (TBM) is not an ordinary system of clubs in the sense of 
Buchanan (1965):  Rather than examining how features of a team good such as 
excludability affect its provision level, we focus on how the process of assigning members 
to teams affects the level of team production. Further, we focus not on isolated groups but 
on a system of teams, and explore how the team assignment method impacts a society’s 
overall productivity. We find that for the system’s overall efficiency contribution-based 
mobility is crucial. Our results show that is not really detrimental for efficiency that 
rewards are team-based as long as team assignment is competitively based on contributions 
and organizational membership is mobile. In such a setting, free-riding loses its 
significance even if rewards are fully shared on the organizational level, i.e. a meritocracy 
is purely collective rather than individually based.9   
Compare a team-based meritocracy to a traditional society in which stratification 
and organizational membership are often based on biased privilege, such as a society with a 
caste system, a race or a gender bias, or with an economy where positions in its family 
businesses are based on family ties. To the extent that such bias is applied, the staffing of 
the system’s cooperative entities is unaffected by the actual contributions of its individual 
members. Organizational staffing is instead based on irrelevant criteria, ultimately an 
                                                 
8 These arrangements have even started to formally apply to immigration: For example, Australia or Britain 
offer preferential entry for immigrants likely to contribute to society, and a similar program is now being 
proposed in the EU. Mobility is guaranteed by a trial period before immigrants gain citizenship.  
9 Kandel & Lazear (1992) present a model where peer pressure, norms and mutual monitoring foster 
productivity in organizations where output is shared. In our model such internal pressure is not needed since 
organizational membership is highly mobile and low-performing members get re-grouped into lower-
performing units.  
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“accident of birth” in the sense of Rawls (1971).10 Such a system of organizational and 
institutional staffing obviously generates incentives to free-ride since an individual’s 
contribution has, in the extreme case, no impact at all on his membership in organizational 
units that vary in their attractiveness to members. It is well known that such societies are 
far from efficient, that their productivity lags behind modern societies that have become, to 
a considerable extent, team-based meritocracies, and that precisely because meritocracies 
are more competitive, they are globally on the rise. Examples include the trend away from 
family businesses and towards professional management, the disappearance of monarchies, 
or the abolition of legacy preferences in Ivy League universities.11  
To our knowledge, this study is the first to show how team-based meritocracies 
sustain very high social contributions by nearly all members of the society even though 
rewards are shared within organizations. We show this with a theoretical model of the 
TBM mechanism (Section II) and its experimental test (Sections III and IV). For a large 
society the TBM asymptotically approaches the efficiency of an individually-based 
meritocracy. At the same time, however, it maintains the benefits that come with team-
based, rather than individually tailored, incentives, such as cost-savings and cohesion.  
Even though the mechanism’s asymmetric, close-to-Pareto-optimal equilibrium is very 
complex, (Section II) the aggregate of experimental subjects seem to intuitively grasp this 
socially desirable solution and coordinate it reliably (Section III). This underscores a team-
based meritocracy’s practical usefulness and may explain its emergence in the field.  
This paper is descriptive, accounting for what is already being observed in the field. 
It is also prescriptive, since our results show that a team-based meritocracy is a highly 
                                                 
10 Rawls’ “accident of birth” concept encompasses not only social privilege but also differential ability. We 
bypass the latter in this paper since our current (introductory) model of the team-based meritocracy assumes 
that abilities to contribute are equal, and we focus on effort. In the Discussion (Section IV) we refer to an 
extension of our model so that agents have unequal abilities with regard to public contribution.  
11 After WWII, legacy preferences were given less weight in order to increase schools’ intellectual 
competitiveness; at the same time, ethnicity and gender-related intake criteria were abolished (Karabel, 
2005).  
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efficient and feasible mechanism to elicit high social contributions. In addition, our 
theoretical analysis also sheds some light on prior experimental results (discussed in 
Section IV) about the effectiveness of competitive grouping as a means to attenuate what 
would otherwise be a social dilemma.  
 
II. THEORY 
We model a team-based meritocracy (TBM) as a society in which participants are 
assigned to teams based on their contributions to a public account. The TBM shares some 
features with the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM, see e.g. Isaac, McCue & 
Plott, 1985), which has become a standard model for the exploration of free-riding and 
which, we will argue, is a good model for a privilege-based society. We now briefly 
describe the former before adding how a team-based meritocracy differs. 
In the VCM, N participants are randomly assigned to G groups of fixed size n. With 
its random team assignment, the VCM models a society in which grouping into cooperative 
units is based on arbitrary criteria that are unrelated to output and not under a person’s 
control, such as race or gender. After having been grouped, members each decide 
simultaneously and anonymously how much of their individual endowment w to keep for 
themselves, and how much to contribute to a group account. Contributions to the group 
account are multiplied by a factor g representing the benefits from cooperation (see, e.g., 
Hamilton, Nickerson & Owan, 2003), before being equally divided among all n group 
members. In the remainder of this paper, we denote the rate g/n by m. This is the marginal 
per capita return (henceforth, MPCR) to each group member from an investment in the 
group account. As long as 1 > m > 1/n, the VCM game is a social dilemma: efficiency is 
maximized if all participants contribute fully, but each individual’s dominant strategy is to 
contribute nothing to the group account.  
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The TBM has a different equilibrium structure because group membership is 
competitively based on individuals’ public contributions. All participants get ranked 
according to their contributions to the public account. Based on this ranking, they are 
partitioned into equal-sized teams. For the formal equilibrium analysis of the TBM game 
(Sections II.A and II.B below) it is important to note that any ties for group membership 
are broken at random. Finally, individual earnings are computed taking into account to 
which team a subject has been assigned. All this is common knowledge. 
The TBM also differs from the VCM in how society is modeled. In the VCM each 
arbitrarily composed team exists in isolation. Social mobility is not modeled and in fact, 
does not exist in a society strictly based upon birth-based privilege. The TBM in contrast is 
not just about a single, isolated group, but about a society consisting of multiple teams. In 
the TBM all socially mobile members of a community are linked via a cooperative-
competitive mechanism. Through their contribution decisions they compete for 
membership in stratified teams with potentially different collective output and payoffs. The 
TBM’s equilibrium analysis (below) must therefore extend not just over one group, but 
over the multiple groups of an organizationally stratified society.  
The TBM has a close to Pareto-optimal equilibrium: In contrast to the VCM with 
its dominant strategy equilibrium of non-contribution by all, the TBM has two12 pure-
strategy equilibria, which differ in efficiency.13 One of the equilibria is non-contribution by 
all, which underscores that the TBM game has some social dilemma properties. Section 
II.B however shows that with the introduction of competitive team assignment, the social 
dilemma property is much attenuated.  The TBM has a second, asymmetric pure strategy 
                                                 
12 See the Theorem in Section II.B for rare borderline cases in which there are only one or even three.  
13 Additionally and depending on the parameters, there exist mixed-strategy equilibria. They are beyond the 
scope of this paper since: 1) they are intuitively implausible in a game where there is no stringent need to play 
unpredictably (see, e.g., Kreps, 1990, pp. 407-410; Aumann, 1985, p. 19). 2) even in situations where a 
unique equilibrium in mixed strategies would require that players keep each other guessing, it is usually 
beyond players’ abilities (see e.g., Walker & Wooders , 2001; Brown & Rosenthal, 1990; Erev & Roth, 
1998). 3) in the TBM’s experimental test subjects clearly play a pure strategy equilibrium (See Section III.B).  
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equilibrium that is very close to Pareto optimal,  and where almost all participants 
contribute their entire endowment and only few contribute nothing. Section II.B makes it 
obvious that this near-efficient equilibrium is complex and counterintuitive. Yet this 
equilibrium is very reliably coordinated in experimental tests (see Section III). 
 
II.A Formal Definition of the TBM  
A team-based meritocracy (TBM) is defined as a game with N players. As in the 
VCM, each player i = 1, …, N has an endowment w > 0, makes a contribution si ∈ [0; w] to 
a public account, and keeps the remainder (w – si) in her private account. It follows that the 
contribution si completely characterizes a player’s strategy. After their investment 
decisions, all players are ranked according to their public contributions and divided into G 
groups of equal size n (G = N/n). Note that ties are broken at random. The n players with 
the highest contributions are put into group 1; the n players with the next highest 
contributions are put into group 2, and so on. Without loss of generality, let s1 ≥ s2 ≥ … ≥ 
sN, i. e. group 1 consists of players 1 to n, group 2 of players (n + 1) to 2n and so on. 
Payoffs are computed after players have been grouped this way, including the random 
resolution of ties. Each player’s payoff πi consists of the amount kept in her private 
account, plus the total public contribution of all players in the group she has been assigned 
to, multiplied by the MPCR g/n = m ∈ (1/n; 1):  
 
 
II.B. Deriving the TBM’s equilibria 
Observation 1: Obviously, the strategy profile s1 = s2 = … = sN = 0 is an equilibrium. 
Since m < 1, no player can profit from contributing a strictly positive amount to the group 
account if all others give zero. 
[ ]
[ ]∑ −+−−
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In the remainder of this section we derive the alternative Pareto dominant 
equilibria, which are much more complex. We start by assuming that an equilibrium with 
positive contributions exists and describe its general characteristics in Observation 2. This 
is followed by a theorem that specifies all pure strategy equilibria, and the criteria for the 
existence and uniqueness of Pareto dominant near-efficient equilibria.  
 
Observation 2: If an equilibrium with positive contributions exists, each player contributes 
either zero or her entire endowment w. Moreover, the number of players who contribute 
their entire endowment is larger than N – n.  
We break the proof of Observation 2 into four Lemmas and prove each of them separately. 
To start with, consider the case in which some players make strictly positive contributions. 
Let h = maxi {si | i = 1, … N} denote the highest contribution, H the set of players 
contributing h (i.e. si = h ∀ i ∈ H), and b = |H| the number of players contributing h. 
 
 Lemma 1. If some strategies are positive, then in equilibrium b > n and (b mod n) > 0, i.e. 
a high contributor i ∈ H will be grouped with positive probability with some other 
player(s) who contribute(s) less than she does.  
Proof.  (Clearly, b < N, else each player could profit from unilaterally changing her 
contribution from h to zero.) If b mod n were zero, player i, who at present contributes h, 
could reduce her contribution by a small ε  and still remain grouped exclusively with high 
contributors. By the same logic, b must be larger than n.  
■ 
 
Lemma 2:  When some strategies are positive in equilibrium, the highest contribution h 
cannot be smaller than w. 
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Proof: We know from Lemma 1 that a high-contributor i ∈ H is grouped with positive 
probability with at least one player who contributes less than h. Her expected payoff Eπi(h)  
is smaller than w – h + m n h. Assume h were smaller than w and let Δ := w – h + m n h – 
Eπi(h) (Δ > 0). Let player i increase her contribution from h to h' := min {h + Δ / (2 (1-m)); 
w}. Then, player i will be grouped with only high contributors with certainty. Denote her 
expected payoff by  Eπi(h').14 
).(
2/
2222
')1(')'(
hEmnhhw
mnhhw
m
mmhmhmnh
m
hw
mhhnmhwhE
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i
π
π
=Δ−+−>
Δ−+−=−
Δ++−+−
Δ−−≥
+−+−=
 
Thus, contributing h' rather than h makes player i better off. Consequently, in equilibrium 
the highest positive contribution cannot be smaller than w. 
■ 
 
Lemma 3: When some strategies are positive in equilibrium, there cannot be any player j 
who contributes sj with 0 < sj < w.  
Proof: According to Lemma 2, if some strategies are positive the highest contribution is w. 
Moreover, the number b of players contributing w is larger than n (Lemma 1). Define b' := 
(b mod n) and consider player j whose contribution sj > 0 is the maximum of all 
contributions smaller than w (j ∉ H). Assume first that there are no ties with respect to the 
group membership of player j. Then player j could contribute slightly less and remain in 
that same group with certainty. This cannot be equilibrium. If, on the other hand, we allow 
for player j being tied for group membership, then with probability p she will be in a group 
in which sj is the highest contribution. Only with probability (1-p), will she be in a group in 
                                                 
14 The weak inequality “≥” in the second line holds strictly (“>”) if h' = w. If h' = h + Δ / (2 (1-m)) it holds 
with equality (“=”). 
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which (n-b') players contribute sj and b' players contribute w. Her expected payoff is 
therefore: 
( )
( ).'')'(
')'()1()(
jjj
jjjjj
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wbsbnmpmnspswsE
−−+−+−=
+−−++−≤π
    (1) 
If player j increased her contribution to sj' = min{sj+1/2 pmb' (w-sj)/(1-m); w}, she would 
be in a group with a higher total contribution with certainty. Her alternative payoff Eπj(sj') 
can be estimated with respect to a lower bound by15 
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The difference Eπj( sj') – Eπ j( sj) is:  
.0)('
2
1)()'( >−≥− jjjjj swpmbsEsE ππ       (3) 
Thus, player j would profit from unilaterally deviating by increasing her contribution sj, 
hence this cannot be an equilibrium.  
■ 
 
Lemma 4: In any equilibrium with positive, contributions, the number z := N – b of players 
contributing zero is smaller than n.  
Proof: It was shown above that in equilibrium (b mod n) > 0. Consequently, ((N – b) mod 
n) > 0 as well. If z were larger than n, then any zero contributor could increase her payoff 
by contributing some small ε and become with certainty a member of the mixed group, in 
which some members contribute their entire endowment w. In this case her expected payoff 
                                                 
15 Again, the weak inequality “≥” holds strictly (“>”) if sj' = w. 
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is clearly higher than if she were grouped with these same players only with some 
probability p < 1. 
▀ 
Observation 2 follows immediately from Lemmas 1-4.  
 
 
Theorem: If m < 
1
1
2 +−
+−
nNn
nN , the only equilibrium of the TBM is all players contributing 
nothing. If 
1
1
2 +−
+−≥
nNn
nNm , the TBM has, additionally, a near-efficient equilibrium in 
which all but z < n players contribute their entire endowment w and only the remaining z 
players contribute nothing. z is the integer between a lower bound l and an upper bound u 
where 
mmnmN
mNNl −+−
−=
1
:    and  
mmnmN
mNNu −+−
−+=
1
1:  
In general, this near-efficient equilibrium is unique (and strict).16 As the number of groups 
G increases, the range of MPCRs m, for which a near-efficient equilibrium exists, 
converges to the interval (1/n, 1). 
Only if 
mmnmN
mNN
−+−
−
1
is an integer strictly smaller than n – 1, there exist two equilibria 
involving full contributions, and the number of full contributors in them differs by one.  
Proof. Consider the case in which b (b > N-n) players contribute fully to the group account 
and the remaining z = N – b players contribute zero (z ∈ {1, 2, …, n – 1}). In order to 
identify all equilibria that satisfy the characteristics stated in Observation 2, it now remains 
to show for which b (or z) no full contributor has an incentive to change her contribution to 
zero, and no zero-contributor has an incentive to change her contribution to w. Denote the 
                                                 
16 Of course, z actually characterizes a set of equilibria. Even if the structure is unique there are 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
z
N
combinations in which z players contribute nothing and (N-z) players contribute fully.  
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expected payoffs of a full and a zero-contributor by Eπb(w) and Eπz(0), and the respective 
alternative expected payoffs of a full contributor unilaterally deviating to zero and a zero-
contributor deviating to contributing w by Eπb(0) and Eπz(w). These payoffs are as follows: 
( )
( )
( ) mnw
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     (4) 
and in all equilibria that involve positive contributions the following must hold: 
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Thus, the terms 
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1
:          and        
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−+=
1
1:    , 
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respectively, constitute a lower and an upper bound of z.  
Since z ∈ {1, 2, …, n-1}, equilibria with positive contributions only exist if l ≤ n – 1 and u 
≥ 1.  
The difference u – l between the upper and the lower bound of z is exactly one. Thus, the 
interval [l, u] contains at least one integer; it contains exactly two integers if and only if 
both l and u are (feasible) integers.  
Also note that since m < 1 
.1
1
1
1
1 =−+−
−+>−+−
−+=
mmnmN
NN
mmnmN
mNNu   (7) 
Thus, the upper bound u does not impose a restriction on the existence of an equilibrium 
with full contributions. However, for the lower bound l one needs to ensure that 
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
+−
+−≥⇔
≥+−+−⇔
−+−
−=≥−
nNn
nNm
NmnmnmNn
mmnmN
mNNln
       (8) 
Note that from (8) we have17 
nnnNn
nN
nNn
nNm 11
1
1
22 =+−
+−>+−
+−≥        (9)  
It can therefore be seen that equilibria with positive contributions do not exist for all m > 
1/n (or for all g>1). However, the threshold condition for m is rather weak in the sense that 
the threshold
1
1
2 +−
+−
nNn
nN  in (9) converges to 1/n as G →∞. To see this, rewrite 
1
1
2 +−
+−
nNn
nN  as 
1
1
22 +−
+−
nGn
nGn . Its limit computes to
nnGn
nGn
G
1
1
1lim 22 =+−
+−
∞→ . Moreover, if the 
group size n increases, the threshold converges to zero, i.e. 0
1
1lim 22 =+−
+−
∞→ nGn
nGn
n
. So, the 
                                                 
17 The inequality is strict because n > 1. 
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range of MPCRs for which a near-efficient equilibrium exists converges to the interval (0, 
1).  
▀ 
  
To summarize this section, an equilibrium of a TBM has the structure that either no 
player contributes anything to the group account or that z < n players contribute nothing 
and the remaining N – z players contribute their entire endowment. Note that in a near-
efficient equilibrium, there is always exactly one mixed group consisting of full 
contributors and non-contributors, while all other groups consist of contributors only. This 
implies that in equilibrium a player who contributes fully will be grouped together with 
non-contributors with some positive probability. 
 
II.C Properties of the near-efficient equilibrium 
Increases in a society’s scale and scope. We now examine how the TBM’s near-
efficient equilibrium is affected by changes in a society’s size or scale. Such increases may 
be due to population increase or economic integration such as the removal of trade barriers. 
Size increases may or may not go hand in hand with increases in the scale of organizations. 
We show that the TBM’s near-efficient equilibrium is often much more efficient, and never 
significantly less efficient, the larger the society’s size or scale. In many cases, if the 
society is large, the TBM asymptotically approaches the full efficiency traditionally 
associated with individually based meritocracies.  
We report effects of changes in the number of groups, the group size, and the 
parameter g, which represents the gains from cooperation.  Note that if n increases, the 
MPCR  m = g/n and  g cannot be kept constant at the same time. Since both m and g affect 
incentives in a game with some social dilemma properties (Isaac & Walker, 1988), we 
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additionally examine a simultaneous increase of both n and g , that is, an increase in 
organizational scale while keeping the MPCR m constant.                                                                           
Increases in G, the number of teams. The Pareto-dominant equilibrium’s relative 
efficiency (measured by Nws
N
i
i∑
=1
) increases if more teams of size n join the society, 
because z, the number of zero-contributors in the near-efficient equilibrium, does not grow 
with G. If G becomes very large, the equilibrium’s relative efficiency asymptotically 
approaches the efficiency of an individually based meritocracy. Formally stated:  . 
Lemma 5: z is non-increasing in G, and converges quickly to ⎥⎥
⎤⎢⎢
⎡ −
m
m1 18 as G becomes 
large. 
Proof: The lower bound of z is 
.
11 mmnmnG
mnGnG
mmnmN
mNNl −+−
−=−+−
−=      (10) 
The derivative of this lower bound with respect to G computes to 
( )( )
( )21
1m-1n
mmnmnG
mmn
Gd
ld
−+−
+−−=  < 0. Thus, both the lower and the upper bound of z are 
strictly decreasing and the number of zero-contributors cannot be increasing in G. Further, 
reformulate l as follows: 
.
11
1
1
mn
mG
G
m
m
mmnmnG
mnGnGl −+−
−=−+−
−=      (11) 
It can be seen that l converges to (1 – m) / m if G grows to infinity. Recall that the number 
of non-contributors is the smallest integer at least as large as l. 
▀ 
 
                                                 
18 The symbol ⎡ ⎤x  refers to the smallest integer which is not smaller than x. 
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Variations in g, the benefits from cooperation.  Increasing g raises the payoff from 
contributing and eventually lowers z and increases efficiency.19 
Lemma 6: The number z of zero contributors in a near-efficient equilibrium is non-
increasing in g and—depending on g—can be any value of the set {1, 2, … n-1}; 
Proof: Since m = g/n, the lower bound can be reformulated as follows: 
n
gggG
gGnG
mmnmN
mNNl
−+−
−=−+−
−=
11
 
The first derivative with respect to g is ( ) 0
)1(
2
3
<−+−
−−=
gngngnG
GGn
dg
dl , i.e. 
 the lower and upper bound l and u are strictly decreasing in g. Since u – l = 1, the integer z 
∈ [l; u] is non-increasing in g. Moreover, if 
1
1
2 +−
+−==
nNn
nN
n
gm (i.e. 
nnN
nNg
/1
1
+−
+−= ), 
which is the lowest m for which a near-efficient equilibrium exists (see Theorem), then z = 
l = (n – 1). If, on the other hand, g = n so that m = 1, i.e., both m and g take on their 
maximum values, then z = u = 1. Thus, as g grows from 
nnN
nN
/1
1
+−
+− to n, the number of 
zero contributors decreases from (n – 1) to 1.  
▀ 
 
Increases in n, the team size (g is kept constant).  If n increases while all other 
parameters are constant, the MPCR m = g/n decreases. In other words, the opportunity cost 
of making a public contribution goes up while the payoff if everybody cooperates, gw, 
stays the same. This occurs in the field if the size and scale of a society increase, but 
without returns to scale. z, the number of non-contributors in the near-efficient equilibrium 
increases with this. However, the ratio z/n changes very little and converges to a constant. 
                                                 
19 If g > n, the dominant strategy equilibrium is that everyone contributes. Also note that certain changes in g 
can affect the existence of equilibria with positive contributions, see the Theorem. 
Meritocracy 
19 
This means that even if the MPCR decreases radically due to an increase in n with no 
concomitant increase in g, the relative efficiency Nws
N
i
i∑
=1
 of the Pareto dominant 
equilibrium is maintained as n goes to infinity.  Formally, 
Lemma 7: Keeping g constant, the number z of zero contributors in a near- efficient 
equilibrium is non-decreasing in the group size n, and z/n converges to ⎥⎥
⎤⎢⎢
⎡
+− 1ggG
G  as 
∞→n . 
Proof: The derivative of the lower bound l with respect to n is 
( )[ ]
( ) 0
)(1G
2
22
>−+−
−+−=
gnnggnG
gngnG
nd
ld . Thus, both the lower and the upper bound of z are 
strictly increasing in n, and the number of zero-contributors is non-decreasing in n. The 
ratio l/n can be written as
ngngngG
gnG
+−−
− )( , and ∞→nlim  1
)(
+−=+−−
−
ggG
G
ngngngG
gnG  so 
the proportion of zero contributors z/n converges to ⎥⎥
⎤⎢⎢
⎡
+− 1ggG
G  as ∞→n . 
▀ 
 
 
Joint increase in the team size n and in g, the benefits from cooperation (constant 
MPCR). Often an increase in organizational scale n increases returns to scale (Chandler, 
1996). A simple way to model this is to increase both n and g so that the MPCR m, is 
constant. In this case z, while non-decreasing, quickly converges to a constant. Therefore, 
as n approaches infinity the relative efficiency Nws
N
i
i∑
=1
 of the near-efficient equilibrium 
asymptotically approaches 100%. Formally:  
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Lemma 8: If m is constant, in a near- efficient equilibrium z is non-decreasing in n, but 
with increasing n converges quickly to ⎥⎥
⎤⎢⎢
⎡ −≈
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢
⎡
−
−
m
m
G
Gm
m 1
1
1  if G is also large. 
Proof: The derivative of l with respect to n is ( )( ) 01
-1
2
2
>−+−= mmnmnG
mG
nd
ld . Thus, both 
z’s lower bound l and its upper bound u are strictly increasing in n and the number of zero-
contributors is non-decreasing in n. Further, reformulation of l yields: 
G
Gm
m
nG
m
G
mm
m
mmnmnG
mnGnGl n
1
1
1
1
1 −
−⎯⎯ →⎯−+−
−=−+−
−= ∞→                               (12) 
 
 
This concludes the comparative statics section. We now address one more property of the 
TBM which may impact behavior in the mechanism’s experimental test (Section III), and 
in the field. 
 
Stability of contributor payoffs if others deviate from the near-efficient equilibrium  
The equilibrium of non-contribution by all is inefficient but safe: payoffs can never 
be negatively affected by deviations of others. In the near-efficient equilibrium strategic 
uncertainty impacts the full contributors since obviously, a non-contributor always earns at 
least w. The uncertainty is compounded by the fact that one among ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
z
N
  possible 
asymmetric strategy profiles needs to be coordinated for this particular equilibrium to 
emerge with precision. The exact size and direction of the impact of deviations by others 
on the earnings of a full contributor in what would otherwise be a near-efficient 
equilibrium profile depends on z, n, G, the number of deviators from full contribution d 
where 1 ≤ d ≤ (N-z-1), and the amount of their deviation δ ∈  (0, w].  
Meritocracy 
21 
A desirable feature of the TBM as a mechanism is that depending on d and δ, the 
impact of downward deviations by others on full contributor earnings is often only mildly 
negative, sometimes even positive. Figure 1 illustrates this with an example where w=100, 
n=10, N=100, MPCR=g/n=m=0.3, δ = 50 or δ = 100, and d ranges from 1 to (N – z - 1). 
The figure illustrates that  the impact of strategic uncertainty in a near-efficient equilibrium 
on the payoffs of those who contribute fully is mitigated by competitive stratification, even 
if d becomes large. This fact should facilitate the coordination of the payoff-dominant 
equilibrium in practice since it reduces full contributors’ “fear” (Rapoport & Eshed-Levy, 
1989).   
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL TEST  
Refined by a payoff dominance criterion in the sense of Harsanyi & Selten, 1988, 
the TBM has a clear equilibrium prediction:20 an asymmetric, near-efficient equilibrium 
should arise since “commonly preferred” (p. 81). The payoff dominance principle however 
is not the sole method of equilibrium selection, and not uncontested (see, e.g., Binmore, 
1989; Aumann, 1988; Crawford & Haller, 1990; Harsanyi, 1995; Van Damme, 2002). It is 
therefore desirable to triangulate such a theoretical prediction with an empirical test of 
equilibrium selection for specific games. Does the TBM’s contribution-based team 
assignment indeed induce participants to coordinate the payoff-dominant equilibrium, 
asymmetric and counterintuitive as it is?  
                                                 
20 Due to the symmetry of the players and the asymmetric structure of the equilibrium it cannot however, 
predict a unique strategy profile{ s1,  s2 , .. sN }. 
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III.A METHOD 
Design and participants  
The TBM was examined under MPCR = g/n= 0.5 and MPCR = g/n = 0.3 in a 
balanced design.21 Changes in g affect the TBM equilibrium (see Lemma 6). Hence, 
different MPCR conditions allow 1) an empirical test of Lemma 6 and 2) identification of 
possible behavioral MPCR effects unrelated to the equilibrium, similar to what has been 
found in the VCM (see, e.g., Isaac & Walker, 1988; Gunnthorsdottir, Houser & McCabe, 
2007).  
 Under each MPCR condition, there were four experimental sessions with twelve 
participants each, 96 total. Participants were undergraduates at a large US university. They 
were recruited from the general student population for a two-hour experiment with payoffs 
contingent upon the decisions they and other participants made during the experiment.  
Procedure 
Each participant received a $7 show-up fee, and was privately paid her 
experimental earnings at the end of the experiment. Participants were seated at computer 
terminals separated by blinders. There were 80 decision rounds, but subjects were not told 
their number. At the beginning of each decision round, each subject received one hundred 
tokens to privately and anonymously invest (in integer amounts)22  in either a private 
account, which returned one token for every token invested to that subject alone, or a 
public account, which returned tokens at the specified MPCR to everyone in her group 
including herself.  See Appendix B for the written instructions. 
                                                 
21 Gunnthorsdottir, Houser & McCabe (2007) use a similar game in a ten-round experiment, but the structure 
of their game is not common knowledge. Equilibrium analysis is therefore not attempted. GHM create a 
purposefully vague situation onto which subjects project their stable personal tendencies to either cooperate 
or defect.  Since their game differs from ours in this very crucial aspect, as expected, their behavioral results 
also differ from ours and do not allow direct comparison.  
22 The use of integer amounts discretizes the strategy space, but does not change the results. See Appendix A 
for a discussion on the effects of discretizing the strategy space into unit tokens.  
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Group assignment. In each round, after all subjects had made their investment 
decisions, they were partitioned in three groups of four. The four highest investors to the 
public account were put into one group, the fifth through the eighth highest investor into a 
second group, and the four lowest investors into a third group. Ties were broken at random. 
After grouping, subjects’ earnings were calculated based on the group to which they had 
been assigned. Note that group assignment depended only on the subjects’ current 
contributions in that round, not on contributions in previous rounds. Subjects were 
regrouped according to these criteria in each decision round. See Appendix B for full 
instructions.  
End-of-round feedback.  After each round, each subject’s computer displayed her 
private and public investment in that round, the total investment made by the group she had 
been assigned to, and her total earnings. The screen also displayed an ordered series of the 
group account contributions by all participants in that round, with a subject’s own 
contribution highlighted so that she could see her relative standing. This ordered series was 
visually split into three groups of four, which further underscored that participants had been 
grouped according to their contributions and that any ties had been broken at random.  
 
III.B. RESULTS 
The main purpose of this analysis is to establish whether the TBM is an effective 
mechanism that is, whether its near-efficient equilibrium is coordinated in the aggregate. 
(Results 1-4). Additionally, we report indications of a behavioral MPCR effect, and briefly 
mention how individual behavior relates to the observed aggregate outcomes.  
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Result 1 
The TBM leads to high and stable contributions.  
The solid lines in Figure 2 display mean public account contributions per MPCR 
and per round. Contributions are high and stable over all 80 rounds. Mean contributions 
over four sessions and 80 rounds are 70.1 out of 100 possible tokens for MPCR = 0.3 and 
83.8 out of 100 for MPCR = 0.5.  
Result 2  
Observed mean contributions correspond to mean contributions in the near-efficient 
equilibrium.  
The broken lines in Figure 2 represent mean contributions in the near-efficient 
equilibrium (75 out of 100 tokens for MPCR = 0.3, 83.3/100 for MPCR = 0.5). Observed 
mean contributions per round (solid lines) closely trace the predicted values. This pattern 
also emerges in the single sessions. See Table 1 for means per session. The paths of single 
sessions over trials (Figure 3) resemble their aggregate pattern in Figure 2. As expected, 
mean contributions under MPCR = 0.3 are significantly lower than under MPCR = 0.5.23  
Result 3 
Strategies that are part of the near-efficient equilibrium were predominantly selected.   
 The near-efficient equilibrium consists of the two corner strategies from among a 
set of 101 choices. Figure 4 displays the percentages in which choices occurred, by MPCR.  
Under both MPCRs, subjects predominantly selected corner strategies. 83% of choices 
under MPCR = 0.5 and 56% of choices under MPCR = 0.3 are exact corner strategies. 
Choices closely neighboring the exact corner strategies are also somewhat more frequent in 
particular under MPCR = 0.3.  If one classifies choices ≥ 98 as full contribution, and 
choices ≤ 2 as non-contribution in accordance with both the prominence hypothesis 
                                                 
23 Mann-Whitney-U-test: U = 0 (n1 = n2 = 4), p = 0.014 (1-tailed). The unit of observation is one session. 
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(Selten, 1997) that people tend to make their choices in multiples of five, and the argument 
about neighboring strategies by Erev and Roth (1998), 86 % of all choices under MPCR = 
0.5, and 66% of choices under MPCR = 0.3 are corner strategies. Clearly, corner strategies 
were selected with greater precision under MPCR = 0.5 than under MPCR = 0.3. Further 
below we address these percentage differences between MPCRs when pure counts are 
used, and why under MPCR = 0.3 neighboring strategies are more frequent.   
Result 4 
The aggregate proportions in which equilibrium strategies were selected are very 
close to the near-efficient equilibrium.  
In the near-efficient equilibrium ten out of twelve participants (83.3%) make a full 
contribution under MPCR = 0.5, and nine out of twelve under MPCR = 0.3, while the 
remainder contributes nothing. See the broken lines in Figure 5. The figure’s solid lines 
display the respective observed percentages per round and per MPCR, with choices ≥ 98 
classified as full contribution and choices ≤ 2 classified as non-contribution. Within a few 
trials subjects reach close-to-equilibrium proportions. Figure 6 confirms this aggregate 
pattern for every single session even though the pattern is somewhat less pronounced under 
MPCR = 0.3, particularly in Session 0.3-1.   
Additional findings:   
Behavior is closer to equilibrium under MPCR = 0.5 than under MPCR = 0.3. 
In order to test how close to the equilibrium the behavior in each single round is, we 
counted the number of individual contributions which can be exactly explained by the 
equilibrium prediction. If, for example, in a particular round under MPCR = 0.5 (where in 
the near-efficient equilibrium there are two zero-contributions and ten full contributions) 
the observed contributions are (0, 0, 0, 2, 75, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100), the 
number of contributions consistent with the equilibrium is nine (two of the zero-
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contributions and the seven full contributions). Table 1 shows that behavior under MPCR = 
0.5 is closer to the near-efficient equilibrium than under MPCR = 0.3.24 25  
Individual strategies are unsystematic.  
Graphs of all individual choice paths over trials can be viewed at 
http://anna.rvik.com/M/indls.pdf.  In each MPCR condition, there are actually ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
z
N
 near-
efficient equilibrium profiles, since each player can either take the role of a full contributor 
or of a non-contributor. As Ochs (1999, p.143) states very well, once a specific 
configuration of mutual best responses is reached, one might reasonably expect that this 
pattern will be stable over repetitions. Our data show the opposite: While the near-efficient 
equilibrium organizes aggregate behavior, individual choice paths over trials are diverse 
and unsystematic. Some subjects stick with one (mostly equilibrium) strategy,26 others 
alternate, in varying proportions, between the two equilibrium strategies, or between 
equilibrium strategies and intermediate choices. There is no evidence that individual 
strategies stabilize with experience, nor is there evidence of mixing.27   
                                                 
24 Mann-Whitney-U-test: U = 0 (n1 = n2 = 4), p = 0.029 (2-tailed). The unit of observation is one session.   
25 A possibly related behavioral effect occurs in  the VCM where the speed of convergence toward  the sole 
equilibrium non-contribution by all depends on the MPCR (see, e.g., Isaac & Walker, 1988; Gunnthorsdottir, 
Houser & McCabe, 2007). There are two possible reasons for such behavioral MPCR effects, both of which 
could operate in the TBM as well: 1) the lower the MPCR the less of a difference there is between the 
individual payoff when everybody contributes and the individual payoff when nobody contributes.  For a 
TBM this means that the lower the MPCR the less of a difference there is between the equilibrium of non-
contribution by all and the near-efficient equilibrium. A low MPCR may therefore generate indifference in 
TBM participants.  2) There is ample evidence, starting with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) seminal work, 
that people are sensitive to the risk of losses in relation to their original wealth w. In the VCM, the maximum 
a contributor can lose is (1-g/n) w if she is the sole contributor, while non-contribution guarantees her a 
payoff of at least w. This logic holds for the TBM as well even though, as Section II.C shows, in terms of 
expected (ex-ante) payoffs the risk is mitigated by competitive grouping. For ex-post payoffs however the 
MPCR can have a strong effect if a contributor ends up in a mixed group.  
26 31% of subjects under MPCR=0.5 made a full contribution in ≥ 70 of the 80 trials. Under MPCR = 0.3, 
21% subjects did. There are hardly any stable non-contributors. If those who contributed ≤ 2 in ≥ 50% of all 
trials are classified as non-contributors, there are only 6/96 such subjects, all in MPCR = 0.3 (contributing ≤ 2 
in 75, 65, 54, 43, 43 and 40 trials, respectively). 
27Under the experiment’s parameters, two mixed-strategy equilibria consisting of corner strategies exists for 
MPCR=0.5, where either p(xi=100) = 0.883 or p(xi=100) = 0.117). None exists for MPCR=0.3. Yet in both 
conditions aggregate behavior is well accounted for by the near-efficient pure strategy equilibrium. While 
under MPCR=0.5 the pure strategy equilibrium proportion of 83.3% for (xi=100) happens to be close to the 
mixed-strategy equilibrium probability of p(xi=100) = 88.3%, aggregate behavior is clearly closer to the pure 
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III.C  RELATED EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS  
Coordinating a complex asymmetric equilibrium.  We have seen that the TBM’s 
asymmetric equilibrium is reliably coordinated in the aggregate even though individual 
choices over trials are unsystematic. A related phenomenon has frequently been reported in 
experiments with Market Entry games (henceforth, MEG) (Selten & Guth, 1982; Gary-
Bobo, 1990; see Ochs, 1999 for an overview of their behavioral results). In MEGs, too, an 
asymmetric equilibrium is coordinated apparently “without learning and communication” 
(Camerer & Fehr, 2006, p. 50) while individual-level data are unsystematic (see, e.g., 
Rapoport, Seale & Winter, 2002; Erev & Rapoport, 1998; Duffy & Hopkins, 2005). 
Kahneman (1988, p. 12) calls this phenomenon “magical”. Note however that the TBM is 
much more complex than Market entry games since: 1) the strategy space in Market Entry 
games is usually only binary (enter/stay out), 2) the MEG’s asymmetric equilibrium is 
quite obvious even to a lay person, while the TBM’s near-efficient equilibrium is neither 
obvious nor particularly intuitive, 3) in the TBM the choice among Pareto-ranked equilibria 
presents an additional dimension along which participants must coordinate. Hence, to our 
knowledge, TBM subjects display more complex coordination and “magic” than hitherto 
observed in experiments.   
 Coordinating the payoff-dominant equilibrium. It is by no means a common 
experimental result that, in games with Pareto ranked equilibria, the payoff dominant 
equilibrium is reliably selected. See for example the much-replicated results by Van 
Huyck, Battalio & Beil, (1990, 1991) on Weakest-Link games (henceforth, WLG), (see 
Ochs, 1995;1999, and Devetag & Ortmann, 2007 for overviews), or Step-level VCMs (see, 
                                                                                                                                                    
strategy equilibrium proportions (see Figure 2 and Results 2 and 4). Further, examining individual-level 
behavior, even though many subjects change their strategy frequently over trials, only 5/48 participants under 
MPCR=0.5 randomize (individual runs tests, normal approximation, p=0.05, 2-tailed) in proportions 
consistent with p(xi=100)= 0.883 (individual Chi-Square tests of goodness of fit, see, e.g., Siegel & Castellan, 
1988, p=0.05) (The latter test assumes independent random sampling. For the subjects who apparently behave 
randomly, the test is appropriate). 
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e.g., Isaac, Schmidtz & Walker, 1989). There are two possible reasons why, in contrast, the 
TBM’s payoff-dominant equilibrium emerges so steadily: one reason is structural, the other 
psychological.   
Structural stabilizing aspects. Regarding structural aspects, Step-level VCMs, WLGs, 
and the TBM all share the feature that their least efficient equilibrium is risk dominant. 
However, as discussed in Section II.C, a full contributor’s risk in the TBM’s near-efficient 
equilibrium is much less than in WLGs or Step-Level VCMs (in the latter games even a 
small deviation by a single player reduces the earnings of contributors significantly).  
Psychological impact of competitive group membership on equilibrium selection. 
Turning now to the psychological factors that are likely to support the TBM’s near-
efficient equilibrium, coordination games boil down to expectations. As Harsanyi and 
Selten (1988, emphasis added) put it, “…[players] should trust each other to play [the 
payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy].” The TBM’s competitive group membership 
probably creates mutual expectations that contributions will be high:  
First, competitive group membership generally raises contributions. In VCMs 
competitive group membership increases contributions well above its equilibrium of non-
contribution by all (see, e.g., Cabrera, Fatas, Lacomba & Neugebauer, 2007; Page, 
Putterman & Unel, 2006; Croson, Fatas & Neugebauer, 2007) while in WLGs it  facilitates 
coordination of a Pareto-superior equilibrium. (Fatas, Neugebauer & Perote, 2006; Croson, 
Fatas & Neugebauer, 2007).28  There can be several reasons for this: 1) Humans generally 
tend to react to competitive situations by competing (see, e.g., Shogren, 1996 for 
competition effects in an entirely different environment)  2) More specific to a TBM 
                                                 
28 The literature on the effects of ostracism and endogenous group formation is also somewhat relevant. See 
Maier-Rigaud, Martinsson & Staffiero, 2005, for a good overview on ostracism; For endogenous group 
formation, see, e.g., ,Ahn, Isaac & Salmon, in press) 
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setting, competitive grouping based on contributions reassures reciprocal cooperator types 
who contribute as long as others do likewise (see, e.g., Gächter & Thoni 2005). 
Second, we suppose that our experimental subjects, like everyone, have observed the 
effects of competition and competitive organizational membership on their own behavior 
and the behavior of others. Therefore, in addition to the direct impact of competition on 
behavior, common knowledge of its effects probably changes expectations and further 
encourages contributions and, in the case of the TBM, the coordination of the payoff 
dominant equilibrium.  
MPCR effects:  The near-efficient equilibrium is slightly better coordinated under 
MPCR=0.5 than under MPCR=0.3. Behavioral MPCR effects independent of the 
equilibrium are well known from the VCM: (see, e.g., Isaac & Walker, 1988; Isaac, Walker 
& Thomas, 1984, Gunnthorsdottir, Houser & McCabe, 2007). There are two possible 
reasons for MPCR effects in the VCM, which, somewhat modified, impact the TBM as 
well: 1) the lower the MPCR the less of a difference there is between the individual payoff 
in the Pareto optimum or in the near-efficient equilibrium, and in a situation where nobody 
contributes. Hence, a low MPCR may generate indifference, and a lack of ambition, in 
participants. 2) Sensitivity to the risk of losses in relation to the original wealth w 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  In the VCM, the maximum a sole contributor can lose is 
(1-g/n) w while non-contribution guarantees her a payoff of at least w. This fact also holds 
to some extent for the TBM even though, as Section II.C shows, at least in terms of 
expected (ex-ante) payoffs the risk is mitigated by competitive grouping. For ex-post 
payoffs however the MPCR can have a strong effect if a contributor ends up being placed 
in a mixed group.  
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IV. DISCUSSION 
We present an organization-based production model of society. We find that in the 
absence of information asymmetries, when contributions are observable and team 
membership it mobile, it is not so much the nature of the good that affects free-riding 
incentives, but rather, the team assignment method. We show that the free-riding incentives 
inherent in the production of team goods can be largely overcome if organizational 
membership is competitively based upon individuals’ contributions.  
Our theoretical and experimental results underscore the advantages of a merit-based 
society above and beyond the obvious:  In large societies the efficiency of a Team-Based 
Meritocracy (TBM) asymptotically approaches the efficiency of an individually based 
meritocracy. At the same time, a TBM reduces complexity and costs as compared to an 
individually-based meritocracy, and may contribute to organizational cohesion which in 
turn enhances competitiveness and overall societal output.   
The TBM mechanism is applicable to a wide variety of settings since the nature of 
the team output is broadly defined and the requirements for a near-efficient equilibrium are 
not very strict. The empirical confirmation that the TBM’s near-efficient equilibrium is 
easily coordinated in the laboratory adds to our understanding of how societies have 
become increasingly meritocratic under growing global competition and greater geographic 
mobility. This paper confirms once more that “much of what social science can 
demonstrate is already ‘known’ by evolved social systems” (Dawes et al., 1986, p. 1183).  
Our theoretical analysis extends the traditional group-level analysis of team goods 
to an analysis of a broadly defined social network in which members compete for inclusion 
in organizational strata that vary in collective payoff. We find that such competitive social 
stratification has a complex, counterintuitive equilibrium. Our experimental results 
underscore the predictive and descriptive power of complex Nash equilibria on the 
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aggregate level. With its rich strategy set and counterintuitive equilibria, the TBM is 
particularly demanding on participants with regard to tacit coordination. Yet they somehow 
manage to reliably coordinate an equilibrium which, we assert, they can neither discover 
nor properly understand. Yet another fact underscoring the power of the Nash equilibrium 
is that while highly efficient, the TBM does not lead to full Pareto optimality since a Pareto 
optimal strategy profile is not an equilibrium.  
Criticisms and possible extensions   
We have focused on the TBM’s efficiency and aggregate-level results. Individual 
decision strategies remain to be examined in depth, as well as, possibly, an MPCR-related 
impact of loss aversion. Another natural next step is to examine how sensitive the model is 
to heterogeneity in the endowment wi.. Any meritocracy explicitly eliminates all 
determinants of organizational membership that could be due to Rawl’s (1971)”lottery of 
birth” except for unequal ability to contribute, e.g. unequal time or talent. In the current 
model all players have equal endowments wi. We do not necessarily regard this as a 
shortcoming of the present model since in the end abilities are multidimensional, allowing 
for diverse “bundles” of public contribution of similar overall value.     
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For the TBM’s experimental test (Section III) the strategy space was discretized 
into integer tokens. Since many social contributions, such as effort, are often not lumpy, 
and even with regard to monetary contributions, micro-payments are on the increase, 
discretizing reduces external validity somewhat, but it does not affect the results: The near-
efficient equilibrium, which exists in both continuous and discrete cases is the coordinating 
principle of subject behavior. 
In the discrete case there emerge additional low-level asymmetric pure strategy 
equilibria, consisting of zero contributions and very low contributions. Their number and 
structure is MPCR dependent.  
Reasons for the emergence of low-level equilibria in the discrete case. While the 
results reported come from a brute-force simulation, the reason for the existence of such 
low-level equilibria, and for their increased number the lower the MPCR, is intuitive: In 
the continuous case of the TBM, changing one’s contribution by a small ε is essentially 
costless yet impacts group membership. Changing one’s contribution by one unit token, 
however, is not costless. Hence, if the strategy space is discrete there can emerge stable 
configurations in which it does not behoove a participant to unilaterally change his 
contribution by an entire unit token in order to switch groups. This tends to occur if the 
groups’ team products are very similar. Team products are more similar the lower public 
contributions by other participants are, and the lower MPCR. Therefore, the additional 
equilibria 1) emerge more frequently the lower the MPCR and 2) involve very low public 
contributions. Tables A-A and A-B list all pure strategy equilibria for the parameters 
experimentally tested in Section III. It can be verified that there are more low-level 
equilibiria under MPCR=0.3 (Table A-A) than under MPCR=0.5 (Table A-B). The near-
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efficient equilibrium, which hold in both the discrete and continuous case, is included in 
Rows 16 (MPCR=0.3) and 20 (MPCR=0.5).  
 
Table A-A 
Equilibria for N=12, n=4, wi = 100, and MPCR=0.3. Discrete integer strategy space.  
(Equilibria in shaded rows hold both in the discrete and continuous case) 
 
  
Strategy Configuration (s12, s11, …, s1) 
(Expected payoff per strategy in parentheses) 
 
 
Efficiency ** 
 
1 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 
(100.00) 
0.0 
2 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 
(100.10) (100.02) 
0.4 
3 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,  2, 2, 2, 2, 2 
(100.39) (100.78) 
0.8 
4 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3 
(100.40)  (100.06) 
1.3 
5 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 
(100.30)  (100.10) 
0.7 
6 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 
(100.30)  (100.20)  (100.22) 
1.1 
7 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 
                              (100.30)  (100.30)  (100.28) 
1.2 
8 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 
(100.60)  (100.20) 
1.5 
9 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4 
(100. 60)   (100.40)   (100.44) 
2.3 
10 0, 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5 
(100.60)   (100.62)   100.40) 
2.7 
11 0, 0, 0, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3 
(100.90)  (100.30) 
2.3 
12 0, 0, 0, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4 
(101.20)  (100.40) 
3.0 
13 0, 0, 0, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5 
(101.50)  (100.50) 
3.8 
14 0, 0, 0, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6, 6 
(101.80)  (100.60) 
4.5 
15 0, 0, 0, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7, 7 
(102.10) (100.70) 
5.3 
16 (0, 0, 0, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100) 
(130.00)  (110.00) 
75.0 
 
** Nws
N
i
i∑
=1
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Table A-B 
Equilibria for N=12, n=4, wi = 100, and MPCR=0.5. Discrete integer strategy space.  
(Equilibria in shaded rows hold both in the discrete and continuous case) 
 
  
Strategy Configuration (s12, s11, …, s1) 
(Expected payoff per strategy in parentheses) 
 
 
Efficiency** 
 
17 (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
(100.00) 
0.0  
18 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 
(101.00)  (100.80) 
0.7 
19 0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 
(102.00)  (101.60) 
1.5 
20 0, 0, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100 
(200.00)  (180.00) 
83.3 
 
** Nws
N
i
i∑
=1
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Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in the economics of group decision-making.  You have already 
earned $7.00 for showing up at the appointed time. If you follow the instructions closely 
and make decisions carefully, you will make a substantial amount of money in addition to 
your show-up fee.  
 
There will be many decision-making periods. In each period, you are given an endowment 
of 100 tokens.  You need to decide how to divide these tokens between two accounts: a 
private account and a group account.  
 
Each token you place in the private account generates a cash return to you (and to you 
alone) of 1 cent.  
 
Tokens that group members invest in the group account will be added together to form the 
group investment. The group investment generates a cash return of 2 cents per token. These 
earnings are then divided equally between group members. Your group has 4 members 
(including yourself).  
 
Returns from the group investment are illustrated in the table below.  The left column lists 
various amounts of group investment; the right column contains the corresponding personal 
earnings for each group member.  
 
Returns from the Group Investment 
 
Total investment by Return to each group 
your group member  
 (From group investment) 
 
    0     0 
   20   10 
  40   20 
  60   30 
100   50 
150   75 
200 100 
300 150 
 400 200 
 
 
 
Example: 
Assume that, in a specific period, your endowment is 100 tokens. Assume further that you 
decide to contribute 50 tokens to your private account and 50 tokens to the group account. 
The other group members together contribute an additional 250 tokens to their group 
accounts. That makes the group investment 300 tokens, which generates 600 cents (300 * 2 
= 600). The 600 cents are then split equally among the 4 group members. Therefore, each 
group members earns 150 cents from the group investment (600/4=150). In addition to 
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earnings from the group account, each member gets 1 cent for every token invested in 
his/her private account. As you invested 50 tokens in the private account, your total profit 
in this period is 150 + 50 = 200 cents.  
 
Each period proceeds as follows: 
First, decide on the number of tokens to place in the private and in the group account, 
respectively.  Use the mouse to move your cursor to the box labeled “Private Account”. To 
make your private investment, click on the box and enter the number of tokens you wish to 
allocate to this account.  Do likewise for the box labeled “Group Account” Entries in the 
two boxes must sum to your endowment. To submit your investment click on the “Submit” 
button.  You will then wait until everyone else has submitted his or her investment 
decision. 
 
Second, once everyone has submitted his or her investment decision, you will be assigned 
to a group with 4 members (including yourself).  This assignment will proceed in the 
following manner: participants' contributions to the group account will first be ordered 
from the highest to the lowest. Then the four highest contributors will be grouped together. 
Participants whose contributions ranked from 5-8 will form another group. Finally, the four 
lowest contributors will form the third group. Any ties that may occur will be broken at 
random. Experimental earnings will be computed after you have been assigned to your 
group. Thus, your contribution to the group account in a specific round affects which group 
you are assigned to in that round. 
 
Third, you will receive a message with your experimental earnings for the period. This 
information will also appear in your Record Sheet at the bottom of the screen. The record 
sheet will also show the group account contributions by all participants in the experiment, 
including yours, in ascending order. Your contribution will be highlighted.  
 
A new period will begin after everyone has acknowledged his or her earnings message. 
 
After the last period, you will receive a message with your total experimental earnings 
(sum of earnings in each period). 
 
This is the end of the instructions.
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Table 1 
Strategy choices by MPCR and by session 
 
  MPCR = 0.3 
Session # 1 2 3 4 Total 
Mean contribution  65.1% 71.2% 71.7% 72.3% 70.1%
# full contributors 19.0% 45.5% 57.8% 57.1% 44.8%
# zero contributors 14.2% 10.1% 4.2% 15.2% 10.9%
#  contributions consistent /w equilibrium 32.8% 55.5% 62.0% 70.8% 55.3%
 
 
  MPCR = 0.5 
Session # 1 2 3 4 Total 
Mean contribution  86.1% 83.1% 81.3% 84.9% 83.8%
# full contributors 82.3% 76.3% 72.3% 73.3% 76.0%
# zero contributors 4.9% 10.9% 7.8% 4.6% 7.1%
#  contributions consistent /w equilibrium 84.3% 84.9% 78.8% 77.7% 81.4%
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Figure 1 
Impact of deviations on a remaining full contributor’s payoff if  N=100, n=10, 
MPCR=0.3  
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Figure 2 
Mean public contributions in the near-efficient equilibrium, and observed mean public 
contributions per round.  
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Figure 3A 
   Observed mean contributions per session and per round, and mean contribution in 
the near-efficient equilibrium, MPCR=0.3, 
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Figure 3B  
 
Observed mean contributions per session and per ound, and mean contribution in the 
near-efficient equilibrium, MPCR=0.5 
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Figure 4 
Relative frequency at which each strategy was chosen, by MPCR  
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Figure 5 
Observed proportions and equilibrium proportions of zero and full contributions 
per round, by MPCR  
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Figure 6 A 
Raw frequencies per session MPCR=0.3 
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Figure 6 B 
Raw frequencies per session. MPCR=0.5 
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